Statement of Research Interests
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My research is focused on the nature of knowledge. I argue that our standard for knowledge is so demanding that our knowledge attributions are nearly always false and we are thus implicitly committed to a kind of skepticism. My research is distinctive for challenging the received ‘commonsense’ view of human knowledge. My knowledge project has two basic parts: one concerns the standard of knowledge, while the second concerns the extent of knowledge.

In the first part, I articulate what the standard of knowledge is. I argue for a kind of anti-luck epistemology on the basis of a distinctive analysis of luck. In “The Epistemic Analysis of Luck” (Episteme, 2015) and “In Defense of a Probability Account of Luck” (Synthese, 2018), I argue that a proposition is true by luck when its truth is not guaranteed by one’s evidence for the proposition. My view on knowledge leads to some of my distinctive positions in epistemology, including that knowing does not require that one’s belief be properly based on one’s reasons for belief, and that foundationally justified beliefs are infallible. I argue for the former in “Knowledge, Internalism, and the Basing Condition” (in progress) and the latter in “Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification” (forthcoming, Erkenntnis). In a newer paper, I argue that two standard assumptions about knowledge—that knowing that p implies that not-p is impossible for the knower, and that one can come to know that p through non-deductive inference—imply a contradiction, which supports a version of infallibilism about knowledge (“Infallible Knowledge and Non-Deductive Inference”, in progress).

In the second part of my project, I argue that our standard for knowledge is rarely met. Nevertheless, we make false knowledge claims because doing so is practically useful. Knowledge attributions are like shape-attributions in that both are usually false and easily recognized as such, but also useful to claim in ordinary contexts, as I argue in “The Principles of Interpretive Charity and the Semantics of Knowledge Attributions” (Acta Analytica, 2015). In “Strict Moderate Invariantism and Knowledge-Denials” (Philosophical Studies, 2017), I argue that the mainstream invariantist view cannot adequately account for our tendency to deny knowledge under pressure. I have further argued that the skeptical implications of my view do not undermine it in “Think of the Children! Epistemic Justification and Cognitively Unsophisticated Subjects” (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming) and “Vicious Regresses, Conceptual Analysis, and Strong Awareness Internalism” (Ratio, 2016).

I continue my work about knowledge attributions in “Useful False Knowledge Attributions” (in progress) by arguing that false knowledge attributions play exactly the same roles that epistemologists claim are played by true knowledge attributions—assuring one’s hearer and designating that a proposition can be relied upon in practical reasoning, among several others—and that false knowledge attributions are conversationally appropriate because they provide maximum expressive power with minimal cognitive effort, as required by both Gricean and Relevance-Theoretic models of conversational implicature.

In the near future I will begin work on a monograph about knowledge, skepticism, and luck that ties together ideas from my past research with some of my new projects already mentioned. My skeptical invariantist account of knowledge attributions coheres with the view that luck attributions are usually false except in extreme cases. However, most philosophers think that the presence of luck is incompatible with intuitive ideas about desert. I will argue that one may accept my skeptical invariantism and the ubiquity of luck without accepting the radical view that we always lack responsibility for our actions. My account of luck that identifies degrees of luck with degrees of epistemic probability supports a graded account of moral responsibility, and further supports a generalized gratitude toward states of affairs that are personally significant.